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Abstract 
In this paper, a protection service model is proposed for an antivirus system. The proposed model has been focused on 
maintaining in secure state of the system. According to the proposed antivirus model, the required behavior has been 
specified as extended state machine diagrams and translated to temporal logic properties by using Computing Tree Logic 
language. Also the proposed model has been converted to a Kripke Structure by using formal verification techniques.  For 
proving the correctness and the reachability of proposed model, some properties of the proposed model are verified by 
using NuSMV model checker.  
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1. Introduction 
Today, antivirus software [1] has important position in business and software development. Any computer 
requires to a security application for maintaining regularize and security of its data and installed software. In 
the recent years, many attacks [2] are occurred to home systems, bank servers and military systems by the 
viruses and malwares. Information maintenance and prevention from unauthorized data access is main reasons 
for using antimalware against attacks and destroying data which has been occurred by invasive malware [3] 
widely and suddenly. So, computer users need the powerful security applications that secures their system 
against the attacks of the viruses and malwares [4]. 
Most attacks to the computer systems [5] have two phases. In first step, a malware tries to disable security 
applications of the target computer system. After disabling these applications, the malware like Trojan tries to 
get access to the important data in the computer system. Malwares like virus removes a set of special files or 
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destroys the important files. Some attacks are executed and handled from intelligence agencies and hackers on 
the target computer systems and users. Some attacks do not need to destroy the security application of the 
computer system. These attacks will be executed by hiding themselves in URL web addresses or in created files 
by using more commonly used software such as Microsoft office, adobe reader, win zip, etc. This type of 
attacks benefits from vulnerabilities of this software. Online security checks the mechanisms of the anti-
malware defends from computer system against these types of attacks. Offline security mechanisms prevent 
from data accessibility in the computer system slightly. However, by increasing software technology 
complication and development, the attackers realize several fresh defenseless spaces in systems that informally 
called "holes" [6].  
Du To some specific problems, verifying the security applications such as antivirus systems are very 
important and essential in security discussion [7] of the computer systems. There are some antivirus 
applications in software development market such as Bitdefender†, Kaspersky‡, Avira§ and etc **. Each of these 
applications tries to compete with each other by presenting more services and easy updating. Of course, 
computer Viruses [8], Spywares [9], Trojans, Worms [10] and other new malwares debut every day. 
In this paper, we present a protection service model for the antivirus system [11]. The proposed model has 
focused on maintaining safe state of the system. We translate the proposed model to a Kripke structure [12] by 
using model checking techniques [13]. According to the antivirus system, we show how we can verify the 
specifications of the system by using Computing Tree Logic (CTL) [14]. So, in the results of verifying 
proposed model if the system output is true, then state of the system is safe and we ensure that the system 
satisfies the properties. Otherwise, if the system output is false, then CTL rules show a counterexample in 
specify path which illustrate that the system is unsafe in this path and the system is not satisfies the properties. 
According to special conditions of the antivirus system security, the counterexamples can be very useful. 
Because, by modifying these paths we can improve secure states of the system. 
This paper is organized as follows: Some of the related works have been shown in section 2. Section 3 
presents the antivirus system model. We show that how states of the antivirus system is converted to a state 
chart model. Also some specification of the system is defined by using CTL rules. In section 4, implementation 
of the proposed model by using NuSMV†† model checker is presented. Finally, conclusion and future work are 
provided in section 5. 
2. Related Work 
Formal verification techniques can be used for analysis of the antivirus and security systems [15]. An 
antivirus model is used in designing the antivirus software and security protocols. Formal verification of an 
antivirus model by using model checking methods is a new idea in software development. Some researchers 
used to formal verification methods for analysis and verification of software systems. In Livadas and Lynch 
[16] investigated that how formal techniques can be used for verifying hybrid systems. They presented hybrid 
I/O automaton model and applied it for specifying and verification of hybrid systems. Qianchuan and Krogh 
[17] presented that how CTL specifications for a state chart can be verified by using a finite-state model 
checker. In [18], a new model has been presented for verifying a website by using  Linear Temporal Logic 
(LTL) logic and formal method. The authors modelled the web pages of a website as states and convert HTTP 
protocols of the website to transition between the states.  
 
 
†
 http://www.bitdefender.com/site/view/our-story.html 
‡ http://www.kaspersky.com/about 
§ http://www.avira.com/en/for-home 
** http://www.pcmag.com/article/print/256703 
†† http://nusmv.fbk.eu/ 
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As another research in this scope Bentahar, Yahyaoui [19] modeled the composite web services based on a 
division of interests between operational and control behaviors. Some favorable properties such as deadlock 
freedom, safety and reachability have been analyzed. The proposed behaviors have been converted to Kripke 
structure by using model checking techniques based on Binary Decision Diagram. Also the Kripke structure 
models have been translated to Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) code by means of Java converter tool. Then 
the models were verified by using NuSMV model checker. 
Souri and Navimipour [20] proposed an adapted resource discovery approach to addressing the multi-attribute 
queries in grid computing. They presented a behavioral model for their proposed approach which separated into 
data gathering, discovery and control behaviors. So, they used the Kripke structure for modeling these 
behaviors and verified their behavioral models by using NuSMV model checker. 
As we studied in this section, and to the best of our knowledge, formal modeling and verification of the 
antivirus system is not studied professionally and completely up to now. Therefore, formal verification and 
modeling of an antivirus system can be one of the interesting subjects for studying. In the next section, we 
present a model for the antivirus system and analyze the temporal logic of this model.                
3.  Antivirus Model 
This section shows our proposed antivirus model which has two parts: PC protection and Internet 
protection. In the PC protection section, the aim of the antivirus is scanning files, finding malwares such as 
viruses, Trojans, worms and finally deleting form the system. By using the offline scanning in the PC 
protection section, we can prevent the system from inputting the infected files to the system. In the Internet 
protection section, the antivirus should check the system security in offline and online statuses automatically. 
We describe the malwares attacks to the system in these statuses, so when the antivirus identifies an infected 
file or suspicious file as a malware in real-time status, it should remove the infected file immediately. A good 
antivirus should present accurate information about the system security status to the user, in addition to act as a 
system protection and the system scan operations. In a systematic vision, the user should aware of the system 
security status. So, there are suitable relations between the PC protection and the Internet protection sections of 
the system protection and the system status awareness.  
In this section, we describe the states of the antivirus system. Also, we present a model for the antivirus 
system which we can verify by using formal verifications techniques. Our proposed antivirus system includes 
two main parts: status section and system protection section. In the follow, we have a brief description for these 
parts. The status section shows the computer security status. This section demonstrates information about the 
system protection section which includes PC protection state and Internet protection states, too. One of the 
important security information of the antivirus system is displaying the system update which is showed in 
status section. Offline and online scanning have been run in states of PC protection and Internet protection.  
PC protection status navigates the system scanning and real-time protection operations in the offline mode. 
The system scanning operations can be run by two modes for scanning and removing malwares. First mode is 
scanning local drives such as Hard disks, CD-ROM drives, DVD drives, USB stick... and removing the files 
includes Viruses, Worms and Trojans. The second mode is scanning and protecting Windows System Directory 
(WSD), for Microsoft windows, because the important systematic files are holded in path: "C:\windows\the 
system32". Some malwares attacks have been occurred in this path. By using the system scanning operations 
with offline scanning, the system must be protected from WSD files. In the real-time operations by calling each 
file from hard disc to RAM and executing CPU operations on the file, online scanning process is executed on 
the file paths. In this process, the antivirus system removes this file automatically by finding an infected file or 
a malware [21]. The Internet protection status navigates web protection operations in online mode. In the Web 
protection operations by calling each web address or URL by using a web browser, the antivirus system 
executes the online scanning process on the URL path. In this status, various files such as Audio files (*.mp3, 
*.wav, *.wma ...), Video files (*.mpg, *.avi, *.mkv, *.flv ...), Executable files (*.exe, *.dll ...), Electronic 
documents (*.pdf, *.ps, *.doc ...) and Archive files (*.zip. *.rar, *.tgz ...) can be transferred from the web to the 
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system. So, our proposed antivirus system should allow to the user to manage the scanned files in two ways 
Interactive and Automatic. According to the above descriptions, we present the following state transition 
diagram of the antivirus system. 
 
 
Fig. 1. State transition diagram of Antivirus. 
 
In the Figure 1, there are seven states and two final states that for the antivirus system setting. Important 
antivirus settings and operations are displayed with seven states. Based on the system setting, the final security 
status of the system will be evaluated as safe or unsafe. Transitions represent choices or the antivirus setting 
options which determine the final security status of the system. In other words, these connections organize the 
procedure of the system security. In the following, we specify the states and transitions of each connection: 
1. Update = (True, False) 
2. The system Protection = (PC protection, Internet Protection) 
3. Real-time Protection = ( Deactivate, Activate)   
4. Web Protection = ( Deactivate, Activate ) 
5. File = ( Local drives, Windows system directory) 
6. URL = ( Interactive, Automatic) 
7. Scan = (Remove, Ignore) 
When the antivirus software has installed on a system, after installation the software update it immediately. 
So, we consider the Update state as the root of the tree and initial state of the system. At first, update state of 
the antivirus system is determined. Two choices are true and false. If the antivirus is not updated, we can 
assume that its state is unsafe. In this condition the antivirus cannot protect the system against the new 
malwares. After updating the antivirus, system protection state can be set by two values: PC protection and 
Internet protection. System protection can be set by both of the values PC protection and Internet protection. 
This means that both of these protections can be activated simultaneously.  
The real-time protection can be set by two values: activate and deactivate. If real-time protection of the 
antivirus is set on deactivated, it makes the system be in the unsafe state. In this setting, the antivirus cannot 
protect the system against the malwares that operates on the system by some events such as reading a flash 
memory. 
The web protection can be set by two values: activate and deactivate. If web protection of the antivirus is set 
on deactivated, it makes the system be in the unsafe state. In this setting, the antivirus cannot protect the system 
against accessing to the dangerous web pages. 
If real-time protection will be active, then files of windows system directory (WSD) and contents of the 
local drives will be scanned. If web protection will be active, when a user wants to get access to a web page, 
the antivirus scans it by using interactive mode or automatic mode. If we ignore the scanning of files or web 
pages, then vulnerability of system infection grows and the system states may fall to the unsafe state. If 
suspicious web page is closed or infected files are removed, then the overall system state will be safe. 
1328   Adalat Safarkhanlou et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  57 ( 2015 )  1324 – 1331 
In the following, we describe how the model of the antivirus system is formulated. Then by using 
formulated model, we present a Kripke structure for the antivirus model [22].  
Definition 1. A state structure is a 4-tuple St = (S, E, R, L) where S is a finite set of states, E is finite set of 
events, R is set of transition relation and L is the state-labelling function [23].  
In the antivirus system, status and system protection sections are sub systems of the main system. In definition 
1, the state structure includes: 
S = {Update, system Protection, Real-time Protection, Web Protection, File, URL, Scan, Safe, Unsafe}. 
E = {(True, False), (PC Protection, Internet Protection), (Deactivate, Activate), (Deactivate, Activate), 
        (Local Drives, WSD), (Interactive, Automatic), (Remove, Ignore)}. 
R = {(Update, system Protection, True), (Real-time Protection, File, Activate), (Scan, Safe, Remove) ...}. 
 
Now, we define the temporal rules for verifying the specification of the system by using Computation Tree 
Logic [22]. In a state structure, a state-labelling function l  L includes three components (state s א S, event eא 
E, and transition relation r א  R) which is depicted by s[e]/r.  
By using verification techniques and labelling function definitions we can recognise that the specifications 
of the model are satisfied or not. Since protection service is very important to show in the antivirus system, the 
following properties are defined: 
x AG (AF (update-false) or AF (web-deactivate) or AF (realtime-deactivate) -> AX (system-unsafe). 
x AG ((EF (url-automatic) -> (scan-remove)) & (EF (file-wsd) -> scan-remove))). 
x AG (file-local & scan-remove) -> AX (system-safe). 
x EF ((url-automatic) or (url-interactive)) -> EF (system-safe). 
x AG ((realtime-deactivate) or (web-deactivate)) -> EF (system-unsafe). 
x EF ((realtime-deactivate) & (web-activate)) -> EX (system-unsafe). 
x EF ((realtime-activate) & (web-deactivate)) -> EX (system-unsafe). 
x AG ((realtime-activate) & (web-activate)) -> AX (system-safe). 
Finally, after showing some CTL formulas in the antivirus model, we show how the expected specifications 
of the antivirus system are verified. In the next section, the implementation of the proposed model is shown. 
4. Implementation 
In this section, to check the properties which are illustrated in section 4, the following command is used in 
NuSMV model checker. First, we have to read the SMV program by name PS.smv, then flatten the hierarchy, 
encode the model variables and build our model. Figure 2 shows the results of the model checking of CTL 
properties by using NuSMV model checker. In the implementation, our proposed model detected successfully 
some critical properties (shown by Green colour). 
Using check_fsm command, we can check the deadlock problem in the finite state machine of our proposed 
model as a performance evaluation. In Figure 3, these results show that our proposed protection service model 
is reachable, fair and deadlock free. Table 1 shows the evaluation results to check the proposed model which 
are obtained by NuSMV model checker tool. Also verification of the ʹଽ model to enumerate all the state-space 
clearly (‘Enumerative’), the number of BDD variables is 9, the number of sifted variables is 1000, the number 
of the swapped variables is 1800000 and the total number of the states is 838860. 
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Fig.  2. Verification of the CTL properties by using NuSMV model checker. 
 
 
Fig.  3. Checking reachability and fairness of the proposed model. 
Moreover, Table 1 shows  the  verification  results  which  are  achieved  by NuSMV  2.4.3  model  checker  
tool  where  the  system  is Laptop Intel Core 2 Duo 8400, 2.4 GHz, 4GB RAM and Windows 7.  
Table 1. Verification result of all properties in the Antivirus model.  
Property Result Time (s) Memory (KB) 
AG(AF(state.state = update-false)|AF(state.state = web-deactivate)| AF(state.state 
= realtime-deactivate) -> AX state.state = system-unsafe) 
 
Satisfiable 
 
85.332 
 
46,236 
AG ((EF (state.state = url-automatic -> state.state = scan-remove)) & (EF 
(state.state = file-wsd -> state.state = scan-remove))) 
 
Satisfiable 
 
11.778 
 
12,952 
AG (state.state = file-local & state.state = scan-remove ) -> AX (state.state = 
system-safe); 
Satisfiable 26.785 37,792 
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 EF ((state.state = url-automatic) | (state.state = url-interactive)) -> EF (state.state 
= system-safe); 
 
Satisfiable 
 
19.935 
 
17,792 
AG ((state.state = realtime-deactivate)| (state.state = web-deactivate))-> EF 
(state.state = system-unsafe); 
 
Satisfiable 
 
16.597 
 
46,956 
EF ((state.state = realtime-deactivate)& (state.state = web-activate)) -> EX 
(state.state = system-unsafe); 
 
Satisfiable 
 
65.332 
 
89,136 
EF ((state.state = realtime-activate)& (state.state = web-deactivate)) -> EX 
(state.state = system-unsafe); 
 
Satisfiable 
20,021 56,880 
AG ((state.state = realtime-activate)& (state.state = web-activate)) -> AX 
(state.state = system-safe); 
 
Satisfiable 
34,098 75,231 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, a model for an idle antivirus system is presented. We showed how the antivirus system model 
has formulated by using formal verification techniques. A specification relation between system model and the 
Kripke structure which enables the conditions for verifying specifications of the system is presented. We 
illustrated the expected properties of the system which can be verified and specified by using formal methods 
techniques. Also we could find the suitable relations between the system specifications and the CTL rules. 
Finally, we verified some properties of the proposed model in NuSMV model checker. The experimental 
results show that our model satisfies all of the specification rules and also detects some logical problems such 
as reachability, fairness and deadlock free. In the future work, we will analyze verifications results on 
behavioral modeling of the antivirus systems and find the correct relations between formal verifications and 
CTL logic in an extended and real antivirus system.      
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